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The number of countries experiencing armed conflict today is greater 
than at any time in the past 30 years.1  This comes at devastating 
human cost.  In this decade alone, more than half a million civilians 
have been killed in Syria, the protracted conflict in Yemen has left 
more than 20 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, and 
violence in Myanmar in 2017 drove more than 600,000 people into 
Bangladesh in just three months. The UN Secretary General has said 
that atrocity crimes are being committed ‘at a scale and ferocity not 
seen in years’.2  
Conflict also comes at enormous economic cost.  For a medium-sized developing country, an 
internal armed conflict costs 30 years of GDP growth, and it takes 20 years for trade to return 
to pre-war levels.  In 2017, violence and conflict cost 12.4 percent of the global economy.3    
Australia has demonstrated capacity to be a global leader in preventing and responding to 
conflict-related humanitarian crises.  It has played a pivotal role in advancing the responsibility 
to protect, it consistently emphasises the importance of a rules-based global order and 
accountability for international crimes, and it has demonstrated success in – and commitment 
to – conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.  These key strengths are 
reflected as recurring themes in Australia’s foreign policy and public statements (see Annex I). 
Australia is also a leader in the Asia Pacific region.  It consistently emphasises the importance 
of regional institutions in promoting regional peace and stability, has long-standing 
relationships with these institutions, and has supported the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) to develop capacities for preventive diplomacy.  Thus, in the Asia Pacific 
region in particular, Australia has a critical opportunity to bring its key strengths and foreign 
policy priorities together with its position of regional leadership, so as to more proactively and 
constructively prevent and respond to conflict-related humanitarian crises.  
The context
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Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. 
© Kathleen Prior/CARE Australia.
The Checklist provides: 
• a list of actions that can be taken by key international and regional bodies to prevent and respond to conflict-related 
humanitarian crises; and
• a list of actions that can be taken by the Australian Government to prevent and respond to conflict-related crises, either 
individually or in collaboration with others.  
Opportunities for Australian Government influencing are identified in four categories: 
• UN institutions (the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council); 
• Regional forums (ASEAN-led forums and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons & Related 
Transnational Crime);
• Bilateral influencing (dialogue, sanctions, military cooperation and defence exports); and
• The provision of humanitarian and development assistance. 
The Checklist is aimed at enabling more effective, collective advocacy on the part of Australian NGOs and other civil society 
actors, and at facilitating more targeted and strategic dialogue between civil society and the Australian Government in 
relation to conflict-related humanitarian crises. 
The Checklist has been designed principally for the staff of Australian NGOs and other civil society actors, to assist them in 
their collective advocacy on country-specific, conflict-related humanitarian crises.  
In the first instance, it is designed to assist civil society actors to prepare for and structure conversations with the Australian 
Government about specific crises, with the aim of building mutual understanding about the approach being taken.  
The Checklist may also be used by civil society actors, individually or collectively, as a tool for assessing: (a) the performance 
of key international and regional bodies in preventing and responding to specific crises; and (b) the actions taken by the 
Australian Government in preventing and responding to those crises.   
Most of the questions relating to the performance of international and regional bodies should be answerable by referencing 
publicly-available information.  Conversely, much of the information required to answer the questions relating to the role 
played by the Australian Government will not be publicly available.  Thus, if the tool is to be used by civil society actors to 
assess Australian Government action, this would need to be preceded by – and ideally, be done together with – Government 
stakeholders.  
Following appropriate dialogue, the Checklist (and discussions generated by the Checklist) may also be used by civil society 
to develop advocacy strategies and formulate public and private messaging.  
While aimed at civil society actors, our hope is that the Checklist will also prove a useful reference tool for the Australian 
Government.   
What is the Checklist
Who is the Checklist for  
and how should it be used
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The Checklist is not an exhaustive list of opportunities available to the Australian Government to prevent and respond to 
conflict-related humanitarian crises.  Recognising that civil society actors have limited time and resources to devote to 
advocacy, and that some forums are more influential than others, the Checklist identifies a select number of key forums and 
opportunities that Australia can most usefully capitalise upon, in line with its foreign policy commitments.  
The Checklist is also not a blueprint for action.  Conflict prevention and resolution is by its nature complex, difficult and 
sensitive, and in any given context there will be myriad reasons for Australia not to pursue a particular course of action that 
may appear to be warranted.  The Checklist aims to disaggregate the various options available, and in doing so to prompt 
consideration of what can be done.  It does not presuppose what may or may not be politically feasible or appropriate in a 
given context.  
We note also that the inclusion of a particular action in the Checklist does not mean that all of the NGOs who produced the 
Checklist endorse such a course of action in a particular context.  Many of us have our own policies regarding the various 
actions described in the Checklist.  
Finally, the Checklist is not a scorecard.  It does not query whether Australia was correct to pursue or not pursue the various 
courses of action – merely whether it did so.  The discussions generated by the Checklist may inform future advocacy and 
campaigns, but the Checklist is not intended to serve as an advocacy or media product in itself.
This Checklist was developed by the following project team:
Author  
Rebecca Barber 
Centre for Humanitarian Leadership,  
Deakin University 
r.barber@deakin.edu.au.  
Commissioning Manager 
Caelin Briggs 
World Vision Australia 
caelin.briggs@worldvision.com.au.
Advisory Group  
Alexander Bellamy (Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect), Jennifer Clancy (Australian Council for International 
Development), Yvette Crafti (Act for Peace); Lily Gardener (Oxfam Australia), Jordan Hoffman and Roslyn Dundas (CARE 
Australia); Majella Hurney and Lauren Harris (Save the Children Australia), Diana Sayed and Emma Bull (Amnesty International 
Australia), and Isabel Robinson and Tara Gutman (Australian Red Cross 4). 
The advisory group gratefully acknowledges the input of Vanessa Jackson, CARE International, New York, and  
DFAT staff who reviewed the Checklist. 
What the Checklist is not
Who developed the Checklist
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Ahmed’s family along with other families had to flee their homes due to recent conflict in 
Hodaidah, walking for nearly 10 hours, and walking through a sand storm.
© Ameen Al-Ghaberi/Gabreeze Yemen/Oxfam
The Checklist
1. UN Institutions
1.1 UN Security Council (UNSC)
 UNSC Performance Australia’s Role
1.1.1 Has the UNSC considered the 
situation, either as part of one of its 
formal meetings or in an informal 
meeting? 5
□ YES
□ NO 
Has Australia lobbied member 
States to request the UNSC 
President to convene an informal 
meeting or to have a situation put 
on the agenda of a formal meeting?  
Or alternatively, requested the UN 
Secretary General (UNSG) (either 
informally or in writing) to bring the 
matter to the attention of the UNSC, 
or encouraged a UNSC member 
State to do so? 6
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(situation is 
already being 
considered by 
the UNSC). 
1.1.2 Have any relevant reports from 
the Human Rights Council (HRC) 
special procedures or mechanisms, 
or relevant Special Representatives 
or Envoys of the UNSG, been 
formally introduced as an official 
document of the UNSC? 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(no relevant 
reports)
Has Australia lobbied one or more 
UNSC member States to request 
the UNSC President to circulate 
such reports amongst the UNSC? 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(no relevant 
reports)
1.1.3 Has the UNSC been briefed by 
relevant HRC special procedures 
or mechanisms, UNSG Special 
Representatives or Envoys, or the 
UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, either in a formal meeting or 
informal interactive dialogue, or in 
an Arria-formula meeting? 7
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia lobbied UNSC 
member States to request or initiate 
such briefings, either in a formal 
meeting or informal interactive 
dialogue (invitation to brief would 
need to be extended by the UNSC 
President), or in an Arria-formula 
meeting (invitations could be 
extended by the convening member 
State)?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(briefings have 
already taken 
place)
1.1.4 Has the UNSC been briefed by an 
appropriate civil society expert, 
either in a formal meeting or 
informal (Arria-formula) meeting? 
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia lobbied UNSC 
member States to request or initiate 
such briefings, either in a formal 
meeting (invitation to brief would 
need to be extended by the UNSC 
President), or in an Arria-formula 
meeting (invitations could be 
extended by the convening member 
State)?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(briefings have 
already taken 
place)
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1.1.5 Has the UNSC issued ‘press 
elements’, a press statement or a 
presidential statement? 8
Such a statement could call for an end 
to violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law, a political solution, 
humanitarian access and accountability.  
It should incorporate a gender 
perspective,9 and where appropriate 
should reference the responsibility to 
protect.    
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(resolution has 
been passed)
Has Australia lobbied member 
States for such a statement?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(an appropriate 
statement has 
already been 
issued)
1.1.6 Has the UNSC passed a country-
specific resolution?
Such a resolution should: incorporate a 
gender perspective; 10 include relevant 
provisions regarding the protection 
of children in armed conflict;11 where 
appropriate reference the responsibility 
to protect; and require regular periodic 
reporting on measurable, timebound 
benchmarks so that the UNSC can 
assess progress.  It could also, as 
appropriate: demand an end to violations 
of international humanitarian and human 
rights law; demand humanitarian access; 
set up a process for accountability (for 
example by referral to the ICC); and 
impose sanctions. 
□ YES
□ NO 
Has Australia lobbied member 
States for such a resolution?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(an appropriate 
resolution has 
already been 
issued)
 
1.1.7 In the event that the UNSC is failing 
in its responsibility: have member 
States explored the possibility of 
referral to the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) pursuant to the Uniting for 
Peace procedure? 12
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(the UNSC is 
exercising its 
responsibility)
Has Australia explored this option 
with member States?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(the UNSC is 
exercising its 
responsibility) 
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1.2  UN General Assembly (UNGA)
 UNGA Performance Australia’s Role
1.2.1 Has the UNGA Third Committee 
considered the situation as part of 
its annual session?  
□ YES
□ NO 
Has Australia sought to have the 
situation put on the agenda of 
the UNGA Third Committee, or 
influenced others to do so? 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(UNGA is 
already 
considering the 
situation)
1.2.2 Has the UNGA Third Committee 
held any interactive dialogues with, 
and considered the reports of, 
any special procedures mandate 
holders, human rights mechanisms, 
Special Representatives of the 
UNSG and/or Special Envoys, 
where there is a mandate for such 
briefings to occur? 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(no relevant 
special 
procedures, 
mechanisms 
or Special 
Representatives   
/ Envoys)
Has Australia advocated for 
interactive dialogues to be held, 
and for relevant reports to be 
considered?  
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(no relevant 
special 
procedures, 
mechanisms or 
Special  
Representatives 
/ Envoys, or 
dialogues have 
already been 
held)
1.2.3 Has the UNGA passed a country-
specific resolution? 13
 Such a resolution could, as appropriate: 
condemn violence; call for humanitarian 
access; and call for an end to violations 
of international humanitarian and human 
rights law, and for accountability. It could 
also mandate a Special Envoy, call for 
or establish a mechanism to investigate 
violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law; and if appropriate 
it should reference the responsibility to 
protect and urge the UNSC to act.
□ YES
□ NO 
Has Australia worked towards such 
a resolution or supported/lobbied 
others to do so?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(resolution 
already 
passed)
 
1.2.4 If the UNGA has not considered 
the situation through its Third 
Committee: has a Special Session 
of the UNGA been held? 14
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(3rd Committee 
has considered 
the situation) 
Has Australia lobbied the Secretary 
General and/or other member 
States to call for such a meeting?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(3rd Committee 
has considered 
situation, 
or Special 
Session has 
been held) 
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1.2.5 In the event that the UNSC has 
failed to exercise its primary 
responsibility for international peace 
and security, has the UNGA held an 
Emergency Special Session? 15
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(the UNSC is 
exercising its 
responsibility)
Has Australia considered the option 
of an Emergency Special Session?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(the UNSC is 
exercising its 
responsibility)
1.2.6 Has Australia initiated (individually or together with other States) any side events on the situation, 
or supported any civil society led events, on the margins of annual meetings of the UNGA Third 
Committee? 
□ YES
□ NO
1.2.7 Has Australia made strong statements at the UNGA (Third Committee and/or UNGA plenary), 
condemning the violence and/or violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, calling 
for accountability and where appropriate referencing the responsibility to protect?  
 (Australia’s statements could be assessed in part by comparing Australia’s statements to those made by other 
Member States). 
□ YES
□ NO 
1.3 Human Rights Council (HRC)
 HRC Performance Australia’s Role
1.3.1 Has the HRC discussed the 
situation, either as part of one of 
its regular sessions, in an urgent 
debate or in a special session? 16 
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia sought an urgent 
debate or special session, or 
requested that the situation be 
considered during an HRC regular 
session? 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(not warranted 
or already 
convened)
1.3.2 Has the HRC adopted a country-
specific President’s Statement? 17 
 Such a statement could, as appropriate: 
condemn violence; call for an end to 
violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law; and call for 
humanitarian access. If applicable it 
should reference the responsibility to 
protect and urge the UNSC to act.  
It should identify remedial action to 
be taken, and clear benchmarks for 
progress.
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia initiated such a 
statement, or sought to influence 
other States or blocs to do so? 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(a resolution or 
statement has 
already been 
passed)
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1.3.3 Has the HRC passed a country-
specific resolution? 
 Such a resolution could: express 
concerns over the human rights situation 
in the country and propose measures 
aimed at improving the situation (with 
specific, measurable benchmarks); call 
for an end to violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law; 
call for humanitarian access; create a 
special procedures country mandate; or 
establish a monitoring or investigatory 
mechanism. It should incorporate a 
gender perspective, and if applicable 
should reference the responsibility to 
protect and call upon the UNSC to act. 
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia sponsored or 
supported a resolution, or sought 
to influence other States or blocs 
to do so? 
□ YES
□ NO
1.3.4 Has a dedicated special procedures 
mandate been created to address 
the situation?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(not considered 
to be required)
Has Australia advocated for the 
creation of such a mandate, and 
any necessary mandate renewal, or 
sought to influence other States or 
blocs to do so?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(not considered 
to be required)
1.3.5 Is there a mechanism in place to 
monitor and/or investigate violations 
of international humanitarian and 
human rights law? (such as a 
human rights monitoring presence, 
fact-finding mission, commission of 
inquiry or independent mechanism 
to collect/preserve evidence for 
future criminal prosecution?) 18 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(not considered 
to be required)
Has Australia advocated for 
the creation of an appropriate 
mechanism, or sought to influence 
other States or blocs to do so? 
This could be done through statements 
made at the HRC or other public 
statements, or by sponsoring/supporting 
a resolution establishing such a 
mechanism
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(mechanism 
either already 
in place or not 
required)
1.3.6 Has the HRC held interactive 
dialogues with any relevant special 
procedures mandate-holders, 
monitoring or investigatory 
mechanisms, independent experts 
or the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights; or panel discussions 
with civil society stakeholders?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(no such 
reports to 
consider)
Has Australia advocated for such 
interactive dialogues or panel 
discussions to occur, or sought to 
influence other States or blocs to 
do so?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(no such 
reports to 
consider, 
or briefings 
have already 
occurred)
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1.3.7 Has Australia made an oral statement at the HRC in relation to the situation, or participated in a joint 
statement, condemning the violence and/or violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law, calling for accountability and where appropriate referencing the responsibility to protect? 19 
 (Australia’s statements could be assessed in part by comparing Australia’s statements to those made by other 
Member States). 
□ YES
□ NO
1.3.8 Has Australia participated in the issuance of a joint declaration in relation to the situation, calling for 
respect for international human rights and humanitarian law and accountability, and where appropriate 
referencing the responsibility to protect? 20
□ YES
□ NO
1.3.9 Has Australia sponsored any parallel events, to enhance dialogue and understanding of the situation 
concerned? 
□ YES
□ NO
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Syrian children gather outside a school 
in Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, on 
September 21, 2015.
© Sam Tarling/Oxfam
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2. Regional Mechanisms
2.1 ASEAN and ASEAN-led Mechanisms
Is the humanitarian crisis occurring in, and/or of specific strategic interest to, Asian States?
□ YES (complete the following questions)
□ NO (proceed to section 2.2)
 ASEAN Performance Australia’s Role
2.1.1 Has the situation been considered 
by the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) or East Asia Summit (EAS)? 
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia sought to have the 
situation put on the agenda of the 
ARF or the EAS? 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
(situation has 
already been 
considered by 
the ARF and 
EAS, or not 
considered 
appropriate for 
inclusion on 
the agenda) 
2.1.2 Has the ARF engaged in preventive 
diplomacy or conflict resolution?
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia sought to influence 
the ARF to consider preventive 
diplomacy or conflict resolution 
measures? 
Australia could seek to maximise its 
influence by convening a group of like-
minded states in the region (for example 
states that have responsibility to protect 
focal points), to work together to propose 
that a country situation be considered by 
the ARF; or alternatively by influencing 
bilaterally within ASEAN.
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A 
(ARF has 
already 
engaged in 
preventive 
diplomacy 
and/or conflict 
resolution)
2.1.3 Has the situation been considered 
in any other relevant ASEAN-led 
forums (including for example 
the ASEAN-Australia Forum, the 
ASEAN-Australia Joint Cooperation 
Committee, the ASEAN Post 
Ministerial Conferences or the 
ASEAN-Australia Leaders’ 
Summits)?
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia sought to have 
the situation considered in these 
forums, or supported other States 
to do so? 
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A 
(situation is 
already being 
considered)
 ASEAN Performance Australia’s Role
2.1.4 Have any ASEAN-led forums issued 
a statement on the situation? 
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia proposed that 
any ASEAN-led forums issue a 
statement on the situation, or 
supported other States to do so?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A 
(statement has 
already been 
issued)
2.2 The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons  
 & Related Transnational Crime
Has the humanitarian crisis caused, or is there a risk of it causing, forced displacement or irregular migration from/to one or more Bali 
Process member States? 21 
□ YES (complete the following questions)
□ NO (proceed to section 3)
 Bali Process Performance Australia’s Role
2.2.1 Has the emergency consultation 
mechanism been activated, in 
an effort to prevent an escalation 
of conflict and resulting forced 
displacement?
□ YES
□ NO
Has Australia sought to activate 
the emergency consultation 
mechanism?
□ YES
□ NO
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3. Bilateral Influencing
3.1 Has Australia utilised constructive bilateral dialogues to promote human rights and/or applied 
diplomatic pressure to influence parties to the conflict?
□ YES
□ NO
3.2 Has Australia sought to utilise constructive bilateral dialogue to influence other States with greater 
leverage over parties to the conflict?
□ YES
□ NO
3.3 Has Australia considered targeted sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) against individuals or 
entities against whom there are credible allegations of violations of international human rights law and/
or international humanitarian law? 22
□ YES
□ NO
3.4 Has Australia ceased military cooperation with any military against whom there are credible allegations 
of violations of international human rights or humanitarian law? 23
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A 
3.5 In relation to any defence exports to parties to the conflict, has Australia complied with its obligations 
under international instruments relevant to defence experts, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty, by: 
 
(a) Denying a proposed transfer if: (i) the transfer would violate UNSC arms embargos adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter; (ii) the transfer would violate relevant international obligations to which 
the State is party; or (iii) the State has knowledge at the time of authorisation, that the arms or items 
would be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes that are specified in the 
treaty? 
 
(b) Carrying out a risk assessment, and denying a proposed export if there is an overriding risk that the 
export will: (i) contribute to or undermine peace and security; (ii) be used to commit or facilitate a 
serious violation of international humanitarian law or international human rights law, including gender-
based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children; or (iii) be used to commit 
or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international instruments relating to terrorism or 
transitional organised crime that Australia is party to?
□ YES
□ NO
□ N/A  
Oxfam works in Za’atari Camp in 
Districts 6, 7 and 8, providing safe 
drinking water and sanitation, such 
as toilets, showers, solid waste 
management and hygiene promotion.
© Adeline Guerra/Oxfam
4. Humanitarian and development assistance
4.1 Has Australia provided humanitarian funding, proportionate to humanitarian needs and Australia’s 
capacity? 24
□ YES
□ NO
4.2 Has Australia’s humanitarian assistance been timely, based on early warnings and conflict analysis; 
and if the situation is protracted, is Australia providing multi-year, flexible funding?25
□ YES
□ NO
4.3 Is Australia’s humanitarian assistance explicitly targeted to address the underlying causes of conflict 
and to address protection needs, including the particular challenges faced by women and girls and 
other vulnerable groups?26
□ YES
□ NO
4.4 If Australia has an Aid Investment Plan for the country concerned: does it seek to address the root 
causes of conflict, and if necessary, has it been amended in response to changed circumstances so 
as to prioritise the protection of at-risk populations?27
□ YES
□ NO
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Australia has made strong commitments in relation to human rights, protecting civilians, accountability, conflict prevention, strengthening 
regional institutions, and providing humanitarian and development assistance.  Some of these key commitments are highlighted below.  
Foreign Policy White Paper (2017)
• We will encourage a more coordinated focus on conflict prevention, rather than waiting for crises to develop.
• We will place a high priority on protecting and strengthening the international rules that guide the conduct of relations between states. 
• We will act in partnership with other states and organisations to uphold international law, and support international accountability 
mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court. 
• We will use development assistance to help partner countries join and comply with international rules-based processes.
• We will promote human rights through constructive bilateral dialogue.
• We will work with countries to advance/protect human rights through development assistance and humanitarian support.
• At times, and especially in cases of gross human rights violations, we will apply sanctions.
Humanitarian Strategy (2016)
• We will build resilience and strengthen responses to protracted and slow-onset crises through effective humanitarian relief and 
development assistance that addresses the underlying causes of conflict, displacement and chronic vulnerability.
• We will improve awareness of and promote compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.
• We will advocate for and support protection of civilians and atrocity prevention. 
Human Rights Council Incoming Members’ Pledge (2018)
• We pledge to address human rights concerns on their merits, applying objective and human-rights based criteria in determining whether 
and how the Council should respond to a situation of concern, and take leadership and responsibility in initiating such action when such 
criteria are met.
• We pledge to work to fulfil the Council’s prevention mandate, [including by] receiving from the High Commissioner ‘early warning’ 
information about patterns of violations, and taking early preventive action. 
World Humanitarian Summit Commitments (2016)
• We will act early upon potential conflict situations based on early warning findings and conflict analysis.
• We will sustain political leadership and engagement through all stages of a crisis to prevent the emergence or relapse of conflict.
• We will address root causes of conflict and work to reduce fragility by investing in the development of inclusive, peaceful societies.
• We will promote and enhance respect for international humanitarian law, international human rights law and refugee law.
• We will speak out and systematically condemn serious violations of international humanitarian law and serious violations and abuses 
of international human rights law and take concrete steps to ensure accountability of perpetrators when these acts amount to crimes 
under international law. 
Defence White Paper (2016)
• We will engage in security dialogue through multilateral security frameworks, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, to discuss 
cooperation to address regional security issues
Annex I:  Australian Commitments 
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El Openshaw and M Sinclair, Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly: A Practical Guide for NGOs, International Service for 
Human Rights, 2017, available at: <https://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/documents/ishr_3rd_com_handbook_eng_web.pdf>
ICRC, Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty From a Humanitarian Perspective, 2016, available at: <https://shop.icrc.org/understanding-the-
arms-trade-treaty-from-a-humanitarian-perspective-2811.html>
NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, Women’s Participation and Gender Perspectives in Security Council Resolutions: 
Checklist, available at: <http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/AdvocacyEducationTools/checklistonwomenparticipation_ngowg.pdf>
Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN Office and to the other international organisations in Geneva, The Human Rights Council: A 
Practical Guide, 2014, available at: <https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/InternationaleOrganisationen/Uno/
Human-rights-Council-practical-guide_en>
Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations, The GA Handbook: A Practical Guide to the United Nations General Assembly, 
2017, available at: <http://research.un.org/ld.php?content_id=36397685>
Small Arms Survey, The Arms Trade Treaty: A Practical Guide to National Implementation, 2016, available at: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.
org/publications/by-type/handbooks/att-handbook.html>
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme: A Handbook for Civil 
Society, 2008, available at: <https://ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/CivilSociety/Documents/Handbook_en.pdf>
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Council: A Practical Guide for NGO Participants, 2013, available at: 
<https://ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/PracticalGuideNGO_en.pdf>
UN Security Council, Working Methods Handbook (online resource), available at: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/>  
Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, A Checklist for Mainstreaming: Children and Armed Conflict-Friendly Security Council Resolutions, 
Briefing Note, March 2013, available at: <https://watchlist.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Hi-Res-Checklist-on-mainstreaming.pdf> 
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1 UN / World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violence Conflict, 2018, xvii.
2 UN Secretary General, ‘Secretary-General’s remarks to the General Assembly debate on the responsibility to protect [as delivered]’ (25 
June 2018), available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-06-25/secretary-generals-remarks-general-assembly-
debate-responsibility>
3 Institute for Economics and Peace, The Economic Value of Peace 2018: Measuring the Global Economic Impact of Violence and 
Conflict, 2018. 
4 Australian Red Cross is pleased to have participated in the Advisory Group and provided technical support in development of the 
Checklist. In line with the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, including neutrality, Australian Red 
Cross engages with Government confidentially on matters of humanitarian concern.
5 For a list of the types of meetings utilized by the UNSC see UNSC, ‘Format of Meetings Related to the Security Council’, in Working 
Methods Handbook, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/methods/meetings.pdf>
6 UNSC meetings may be held at the call of the UNSC President at any time he deems necessary.  The President must call a meeting if 
requested to do so by any member of the UNSC, or if a matter is brought to the attention of the UNSC by the UNSG: UNSC Provisional 
Rules of Procedure (S/96/Rev.7), rules 1-3, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/rules/chapter1.shtml>. The UN Charter 
provides that ‘the Secretary General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security’ (art 99).  This is rarely used, however Australian Ambassador Gillian Bird has observed 
that ‘the little-used Article 99 should become a standard tool’: Statement by Gillian Bird to the UNSC, 10 January 2017, available at: 
<https://unny.mission.gov.au/files/unny/170110%20-%20UNSC%20open%20debate%20on%20sustaining%20peace%20.pdf>
7 Informal inter-active dialogues are informal private meetings of UNSC members, convened in order to hold an off-the-record discussion 
with one or more non-member States.  They are convened and chaired by the UNSC President, who can also invite non-member States 
or experts (usually high-level officials) to participate: see Security Council Report, ‘Informal Interactive Dialogue’, UN Security Council 
Working Methods, available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/informal-interactive-
dialogue.php>.  Arria-formula meetings are informal, confidential gatherings, convened at the initiative of (and chaired by) a member 
or members of the UNSC, which enable UNSC members to hear from a range of stakeholders including civil society: see UNSC, 
‘Background Note of the Arria-Formula Meeting of the Security Council Members’, Working Methods Handbook, available at: <http://
www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.shtml> 
8 A Presidential Statement is the most authoritative of these products, followed by a press statement, followed by ‘press elements’.  All 
are adopted by consensus, and are non-binding.  Presidential Statements are statements made by the UNSC President on behalf of the 
UNSC, adopted at a UNSC meeting and issued as an official document of the UNSC.  Press statements are declarations to the media 
made by the UNSC President. ‘Press elements’ are not recognized in the UNSC Rules of Procedure, however have sometimes been 
adopted by the UNSC when agreement cannot be obtained on a press statement.  
9 See NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, Women’s Participation and Gender Perspectives in Security 
Council Resolutions: Checklist, available at:  <http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/AdvocacyEducationTools/
checklistonwomenparticipation_ngowg.pdf>.  This Checklist applies to Presidential Statements as well as UNSC Resolutions. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Watchlist on Children in Armed Conflict, A Checklist for Mainstreaming: Children and Armed Conflict-Friendly Security Council 
Resolutions, Briefing Note, March 2013, available at: <https://watchlist.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Hi-Res-Checklist-on-
mainstreaming.pdf>
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12 In Resolution 377A(V) (1950), the UNGA resolved that ‘if the Security Council, because of a lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there 
appears to be a breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to 
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, … to maintain or restore international peace and security.  If 
not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within 24 hours of the request therefor.  Such 
emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the 
Members of the United Nations’: UN Doc 377A(V) (1950).  This is rarely done. The procedure was last used in 1982 to censure Israel (S/
Res/500 (1982)).  For discussion see Security Council Report, Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace: An Abridged History, 
available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Security_Council_
Deadlocks_and_Uniting_for_Peace.pdf>
13 Country-specific resolutions originate in the Third Committee and are approved by the UNGA Plenary.
14 The UN Charter provides that ‘the General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion 
may require.  Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the 
members of the United Nations’ (art 20). See the UNGA website <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/special.shtml> for a list of special 
sessions.
15 See explanatory note at n 12, above.  Emergency special sessions are rare – the last was held in 1997.  See the UNGA website (http://
www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml) for a list of emergency special sessions held to date.  
16 Country-specific human rights situations are considered under Item 4 of the HRC’s regular agenda.  Special sessions (crisis meetings) 
are held outside of the HRC’s regular meeting calendar, on the request of at least one third of member States.  Urgent debates can 
be requested by member States during regular HRC sessions, and held following agreement by two thirds of member States.  See 
Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN Office and to the other international organisations in Geneva, The Human Rights Council: A 
Practical Guide, 2014, pp.8-10.
17 President’s Statements are adopted by consensus, and are issued as official documents of the HRC.  
18 Examples of such mechanisms established by the HRC include: the Independent, International Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar, 
established by Resolution A/HRC/R/34/22 (24 March 2017); the independent mechanism to collect and analyse evidence in Myanmar, 
established by Resolution A/HRC/39/L.22 (25 September 2018); and the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, established by 
Resolution A/HRC/31/20 (24 April 2016).
19 National or joint statements may be made during special sessions, interactive dialogues, other HRC plenary sessions, action (voting) on 
a resolution, or during side events.
20 Joint declarations are written statements issued by groups of like-minded States during an HRC session.  They are not formal 
instruments of the HRC.  See Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN Office and to the other International Organisations in Geneva, 
above n 16, p.24.
21 The Bali Declaration on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (23 March 2016) underlines ‘the need 
to address the root causes of irregular movement of persons and forced displacement’, recognises ‘the collective role of countries in the 
region in finding solutions’, and commits to developing ‘a mechanism of the Bali Process to facilitate timely and proactive consultation 
to respond to emergency situations’.  The Bali Process Strategy for Cooperation (March 2016) states, as one of its five objectives, the 
encouragement of ‘innovative solutions to address the root causes of irregular migration, including the enhancement of development 
potential and stabilisation of key areas of origin’.  Both documents are available at: <https://www.baliprocess.net/>. 
22 Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper (2017) says that ‘at times, and especially in the case of gross human rights violations, we will 
apply sanctions’: at p.88.  When considering bilateral sanctions, consideration should be given to the potential human rights impacts, 
and to the work of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.  
Reports of the Special Rapporteur are available on the website of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, available 
at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/ucm/pages/srcoercivemeasures.aspx>. 
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23 Allegations would be considered ‘credible’ if they were, for example, verified by a UN Special Rapporteur or UN-mandated monitoring or 
investigatory mechanism. 
24 One approach to assessing whether Australia has contributed an appropriate volume of humanitarian assistance in accordance with its 
capacity is by assessing Australia’s ‘fair share’.  In its 2017 Australian budget submission, Oxfam calculated that Australia’s fair share 
of global humanitarian needs was 1.9 percent (see Oxfam Australia, Oxfam Australia Pre-Budget Submission 2018/2019, December 
2017, pp.26-27). While this is a crude calculation, it can be used as a rough guide for what Australia can be expected to contribute to 
humanitarian appeals.
25 At the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, Australia committed to: ‘act early on potential conflict situations based on early warnings 
and shared conflict analysis’; ‘address root causes of conflict’; and to ‘work together, toward collective outcomes that ensure 
humanitarian needs are met, while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability over multiple years and based on the comparative 
advantage of a diverse range of actors’: see ‘Australia’s Commitments (Final) from World Humanitarian Summit 2016’ (OCHA register 
version), available at: <https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Australia_commitments_final.pdf>. 
26 Australia’s Humanitarian Strategy states that Australia will: ‘build resilience and strengthen responses to protracted and slow-onset 
crises through effective humanitarian relief and development assistance that addresses the underlying causes of conflict, displacement 
and chronic vulnerability’; and ‘prioritise humanitarian action that protects civilians from serious harm, including violence, exploitation, 
coercion and deliberate deprivation’: Australian Government, Humanitarian Strategy, 2016, pp.7,18.  
27 The 2018 OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Peer Review of Australia identified ‘addressing the root causes of potential 
humanitarian crises in Aid Investment Plans … to help build coherence in the overall approach to fragile and crisis-affected situations’ 
as a ‘strategic opportunit[y] … for further progress on the humanitarian/development/peace nexus’: OECD, OECD Development 
Cooperation Peer Reviews: Australia 2018, 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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